REPRESENTING RACE OUTSIDE OF EXPLICITLY RACIALIZED CONTEXTS
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OORODUCTION
Welfare "as we know it" ended in 1996,1 a victim of a conserva tism that views welfare recipients as lazy and immoral. One aspect of welfare that is, however, unlikely to experience radical change is child support.2 More vigorous child support enforcement has be come an increasingly important component of federal welfare re form bills over the past two decades because of the twin hopes of fiscal and parental responsibility: first, that child support will reim burse welfare costs, and second, that fathers will take more respon sibility for their children.3
Child support programs within the welfare system perpetuate a negative perception of poor people. Many individuals assume that poor men and women are uncooperative -that women would rather stay home on the government dole than collect child support or find work, and that men have left their homes and are unwillin g to support their children. These images of poor people are not just class based; they also rely on stereotypes of gendered and raced behavior.
Th.is essay argues that we must challenge the gendered and raced images in welfare reform cases by making explicit the stereo types that inform public welfare regulations. Even though such ad vocacy may not change the actual outcomes of the cases, it can begin to change the rhetoric, raising public awareness of the effect 1. President Bill Clinton made this promise to the American people. See Jason DeParle, Th e Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Jo urney, N.Y. TIM ES, July 15, 1994, at Al.
2. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Title III, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 . Indeed, the legislation did not change existing child support programs, and it extended child support cooperation requirements to food stamp recipients. See The Personal Responsibility and Wo rk Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Title III, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 822, 110 Stat. 2321-22 . As the states are struggling to implement other aspects of the Act, it is highly unlikely that they will do anything but strengthen the child support requirements.
3. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 95:965 of such programs. Ultimately, advocates can take apart the raced and gendered spaces in which poor people live, allowing them both to stay at home and to leave the home. Representation in welfare reform litigation, then, allows advocates to point out the racialized aspects of their cases. It shows the relevance of race to litigation claims and the litigation process.
As an introductory matter, I want to connect my essay with others in this Symposium. Unlike many other participants, I am examining an issue that is not explicitly race based. There are white and black recipients of welfare; this article is not about violence between the races, or about competition for jobs between the races, or even about litigation between parties who belong to diff erent racial groups. Although welfare reform is not an explicitly raced issue, I want to use it to show the implicitly raced nature of various forms of representation. The goal of this essay, then, is not just to discuss substantive welfare reform; I also would like to examine critically the role of race as it appears throughout the representa tion process.
How, then, is representing welfare recipients "raced"?4 There are several diff erent levels of response that intenveave substantive law and lawyering concerns. First, notwithstanding the numbers, the public perception of welfare is raced black.5 Thus, regardless of the actual impact of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") regulations, their implementation is perceived as affect ing blacks, even though this perception does not reflect reality. In deed, welfare reform can be seen as an attempt to control poor black women.6 Thus, although welfare is not explicitly raced, it is implicitly a raced issue.
4. Professor Jerome Culp identifies "the race question [as] ... 'How does race alter the contours of legal reality?' "J erome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: Th e "Imp ossibility " of Permanent Refo rm, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 966 (1993) (emphasis omitted). For feminists, this issue is phrased as asking "the woman question. " See Katharine T. Bartlett, Fe minist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990) . For a discussion of the dangers of analogizing race and sex discrimination, see Tr ina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wtldman, Obscuring the Imp ortance of Race: Th e Implication of Making Com parisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397.
5. See RUIH SIDEL, KEEPING WOMEN AND CmIDREN LAST. AMERICA'S WAR ON nm PooR 29 (1996) ("Even if one asks a sociology class, most of whom are themselves members of minority groups, 'From what racial background are most AFDC recipients?' the answer invariably is that most of them are African-American."); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfi t Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfa re Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1159 (1995) ; Lisa A. Crooms, An "A ge of [Im ] possibility ": Rhetoric, Welfare Re fo rm, and Po verty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1953 REv. , 1971 REv. -72 (1996 (book review) (suggesting that being black has become "a proxy for poverty, " thus helping to explain myths about welfare recipients and dependency).
6. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Va lue of Black Mothers ' Work, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1994) ; Williams, supra note 5; see infra text accompanying notes 37-55. Professor 1\vila Second, African Americans are disproportionately recipients of welfare; they are disproportionately poor, and disproportionately in single-parent households.7 Thus, even though blacks do not consti tute the majority of public welfare8 recipients, welfare has a dispro portionate effect on the African-American community.9 It follows, then, that African Americans will constitute a significant number of legal-services clients, and that welfare reform will have a significant impact on them.
Third, the legal system is overwhelmingly white. Over 85% of the legal profession is white; only 3.3 % is African American.10 The legal services lawyers who do much of the welfare representation are white; given the race of low-income people, there will be inter race (as well as intrarace) representation.11 In addition, judges are overwhelmingly .
white, meaning that a black plaintiff will, most [Vol. 95:965 likely, face a white judge. And, as studies of race discrimination in the courts show, racial biases infect the-American judicial process.12
Fourth, all representation can be raced.13 Each of us has a race, even though whites tend to think that everyone except them has a race, 14 or else they find it difficult to confront the role that race plays in their own lives, a role that is very different from the role that race plays in the lives of people of color.15 Thus, the mere fact of representation implicates race, regardless of the race of the client or the actors in the legal system. Race will inevitably affect how the representation is conducted.16 The interaction between the lawyer and the client, and the decision whether to make race an explicit issue in a complaint, are "infected" by race consciousness.17
Finally, welfare reform lawyering shows how race might appear in lawyering, when the actual legal problem is not explicitly about race. Although the legal issues in welfare reform do not appear to involve particularly racialized issues because there is no interracial conflict -unlike, for example, with affirm ative action -the "race question" still needs to be asked. How then should race be repre sented in this lawyering? Is it appropriate not to mention race?
12. See (1993) ; Angela Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Jus tice System, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1660, 1686 n.100 {1996) {book review) (noting that eleven states and the District of Columbia have published reports on racial bias in the legal system).
13. For a discussion of what I mean by "raced, " see D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEo. L.J. 437, 440 (1993) .
14. See Rura FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATI'ERS: THE SocIAL CON· sraucnoN OF WHITENESS 137 (1993) ; ELIZABETH v. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 104-07 (1988) ; Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory In tent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969-70 (1993) ; Martha R. Maho ney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Th eory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 217, 221 (1993) . For discussions of race in legal representation, see Clark Cunningham, Th e Lawyer as Tra nslator, Representation as Tex t: To wards an Ethnogra phy of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298 REv. , 1370 REv. -83 (1992 REV. 1807 REV. , 1809 REV. (1993 .
17. For further discussion of what I mean by "race consciousness, " see infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. I am aware that, in this essay, I am using race consciousness primar ily to refer to the impact of welfare on African Americans.
When advocates describe their clients, or when judges write opin ions, where is race?18 It is this issue -the tension between making race explicit, and not mentioning it at all -that is at the core of this article. It could be that discussing race, even when it, for exam ple, invokes existing stereotypes of blacks, will be beneficial to black plaintiff s, and therefore justifiable;19 or it may be that the ste reotypes are too destructive.20 Thinking about race in the context of welfare lawyering may focus too much attention on the negative images of black recipients. On the other hand, and especially in light of all of the reasons that this representation process is "raced,"
why not make it explicit? Yet, given that legal issues in welfare reform affect all races, does race really matter?
In thinking about how to represent race in welfare lawyering, I hope to draw some lessons more generally for litigation in which race issues otherwise might not seem visible. My goal is to explore the implications of an ethic of race consciousness in a variety of different contexts. This essay is, then, concerned with representing race on two diff erent, albeit intertwined, levels: the first is law re form, and the second is lawyering reform. Part I briefly discusses the relationship between child support and public welfare, and then focuses on the requirement that welfare recipients cooperate in es tablishing child support. Part I first shows how the cooperation requirement itself represents various negative images of black men and women, and then explores how courts have addressed these images when confronting legal challenges to the cooperation 18. This is not an effort to criticize legal services lawyers. Having been a legal services lawyer, I know the difficulties presented by political realities and heavy caseloads. Cf. Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services fo r the Po or -A Commentary, 83 GEO. LJ. 1669 LJ. , 1699 LJ. (1995 REv. 1739 REv. (1993 [Vol. 95:965 requirement. By rereading these decisions Part I demonstrates how race and gender are absent and appear not to aff ect the litigation process. Part II examines gender theory and shows the gendered nature of these different representations of black men and women. Finally, Part III suggests methods for challenging the legislative and judicial representations of black men and women portrayed through the cooperation requirement, and discusses reasons to con sider making representation raced.
I. CHILD SUPPORT: AT-HOME WoMEN21 AND ABSENT MEN
In contemporary culture, public welfare,22 race, and gender are integrally connected. While· it is true that, proportionately, there are more African American recipients of welfare than white recipi ents, and proportionately, there are more blacks living in poverty than whites, the majority of AFDC recipients nevertheless are not black.23 Yet the media routinely depict welfare recipients as African-American women, and, correspondingly, as lazy and im moral.24 Race has also affected the distribution of welfare benefits -the history of AFDC shows repeated attempts to exclude Afri can Americans through morality requirements.25 21. Cf. HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY (Barbara Smith ed., 1983). "Home Girls" is a positive term that Smith chose as a way of depicting a black feminist community.
22. This section focuses on AFDC recipients. As feminists have noted, "public welfare " takes many different forms and covers not just poor people, but also private corporations and upper-income families who receive various forms of federal subsidies and tax breaks. See  MARlHA ALBER'ISON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND  OTHER TWENTIElH CENnJRy TRAGEDIES 163, 191 (1995) ; Frances E. Olsen, Th e My th of State Intervention in the Fa mily, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985) ; Martha Matthews, Baby Savers and Fa mily Fixers: Some Reflections on Child Welfare Reform 43 (Oct. 19, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 5 (1988) (pointing out that Americans do not consider the money received by the elderly and the disabled to be "welfare"); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NoT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890 WELFARE, -1935 WELFARE, , at 2-3, 5-6 (1994 (discussing the de velopment of negative connotations for "welfare" programs, in contrast to the neutral, or even positive connotations attached to social insurance programs); Dorothy E. Roberts, Wel fa re and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1577 & n.89 (1996) AFDC recipients are also gendered: they are mothers,26 and they are unmarried. Statistics show that single mothers comprise ninety-five percent of the adults on AFDC.27 Historically, how ever, all unmarried women and African American women were generally excluded from welfare because of their failure to comply with morality requirements.2s
Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC") was part of the Social Se curity Act of 1935, although its roots reach far earlier. Attempts to provide support for the children of morally worthy widows first re ceived national attention at a 1909 White House Conference on Children.29 Ill inois enacted a Mother's Aid Law in 1911, which pro vided money to women so that they could mother their own chil dren; the law limited eligibility to widows who were American citizens.30 Thirty-eight states had enacted similar legislation by 1919.31 The actual benefits received from these programs were highly variable -not only did a large percentage of potentially eligible mothers not receive aid, but the amount received was gen erally insufficient to allow women to stay home as full-time mothers.32 Moreover, in light of the morality standards written into such laws, large categories of women could not receive aid. Only three of the laws allowed unmarried mothers to receive pensions,33 and, in a 1931 study, the U.S. Children's Bureau found that ninetyChild Welfa re or the Rhetoric of Responsibility?, 45 DuKE LJ. 1301 , 1307 six percent of the recipients were white, and only three percent were black.34 After the enactment of ADC, blacks continued to be excluded through morality requirements;3s "man-in-the-house" rules36 simultaneously discouraged the formation of two-parent families while policing the behavior of single women.
The history of aid to poor women is thus replete with attempts to control their lives by conditioning public welfare on their compli ance with morality requirements.37 The purpose of the morality re quirements has, to some extent, changed: the original purpose of these requirements was to support worthy women, while the con temporary purpose is to stigmatize recipients.3s cohabiting with the child's natural or adoptive mother.' " King, 392 U.S. at 314 (alteration in original). The meaning of "frequently" varied, depending on the caseworker; a woman might be "allowed" to cohabit once or twice a month, although, for at least one worker, cohabita tion every six months with the same man meant that he was acting as a "substitute father."
See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGIITS MOVEMENT, 1960 MOVEMENT, -1973 MOVEMENT, , at 62-68 (1993 (discussing the litigation strategy in King); MARTIN GARBUS, READY FOR THE DEFENSE 164 (1971) . Although the state claimed that the regulation was not an attempt to regulate sexual conduct, the pretrial testimony appeared to indicate other wise. See King, 392 U.S. at 336 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The standard is the so-called immorality of the mother."); GARnus, supra, at 157. The Commissioner responsible for drafting the regulation stated that the woman could decide " 'to give up her pleasure or to act like a woman ought to act and continue to receive aid.' " GARBus, supra, at 157-58. More over, it did not matter to Alabama if the man was not the father, nor if he was legally respon sible for any of the children. See King, 392 U.S. at 314. The "substitute father" regulation, then, effectively prevented women from cohabitating. If they married the man, instead of cohabitating, then they were denied aid. See King, 392 U.S. at 318 n.13 (noting that, pursuant to fe deral legislation, although dependent children with two parents in the house could be eligible for aid, so long as a parent was unemployed, the majority of states, including Ala bama, had chosen not to extend eligibility to such families).
The effect of the King regulation was also, not coincidentally, to deny aid to blacks. In the initial complaint, Martin Garbus, the attorney representing Ms. Smith, claimed that the regulation was racially discriminatory. See GARBUS, supra, at 155. He candidly admitted, in a subsequent book, that he had few facts in support of this claim at the time of filing. See id.
Nonetheless, he found that although two-thirds of the AFDC recipients were black, virtually all of the families terminated from aid as a result of the substitute-father rule were black, and that the state's purpose in developing these regulations was to exclude blacks. See id. at 159-61. The Supreme Court, however, struck down the regulation without reaching the issue of race discrimination. See King, 392 U.S. at 313. Fo r further discussion of courts' attempts to avoid deciding race issues in welfare cases, see infra section I.C.2.
37. This was true regardless of the type of "aid" these mothers received. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES 280-85 (1988) (discussing attempts to impose mid dle-class norms on poor women who were victims of domestic abuse).
38. See Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Persp ective, 26 CONN. L. REV. 879, 880-81 (1994) .
A. The Cooperation Requirement
To receive public welfare, a custodial parent must relinquish her39 rights to receive child support, and assign all such rights to the state.40 Generally, at her initial interview with a caseworker, the potential recipient signs a simple form in which she agrees that the state is entitled to collect her child support. The custodial parent must also agree to cooperate with the local child support agency by helping to establish the identity of the father and obtain child sup port payments.41 Federal regulations require states to define "co operation" to include providing information during an interview with the local child support office, and even testifying at child sup port hearings, although the recipient may be excused from provid ing information if she attests, under penalty of perjury, to her inability to do so.42 The only other excuse for noncooperation is the existence of "good cause,"43 and the recipient bears the burden of proof.44 As a sanction for noncooperation, the mother becomes ineligible to receive bene:fits,45 and, in some states, the grant to the entire family may be terminated.4 6 Although federal regulations on the cooperation requirement provide some uniformity, states have adopted various additional re quirements when defining the requirement's parameters. In several states, for example, the state not only requires that mothers provide the names and social security numbers of the fathers, but mandates that their benefits be withheld if they fail to do so, regardless of 39. Virtually all of the custodial parents on AFDC are women. (1995) . While the child may still be able to receive AFDC money through an alternative mechanism, the amount of aid is determined without taking into account the actual needs of the mother. Vol. 95:965 whether they know the father's identity.47 President Clinton has proposed requiring states to adopt such policies.4s
The cooperation requirement first appeared in 1975.49 Congress apparently believed that collecting child support on behalf of AFDC recipients would prove to be fiscally efficient, because the support monies would reimburse states and the federal government for their AFDC assistance.so As a long-term benefit, Congress ap parently wanted to deter fathers from leaving the home, and also to . provide children with the benefit of an intact family.s1 Dual con-· cerns about the "absent" father and the unmarried mother appear throughout the legislative history of the cooperation requirement.sz
The fiscal concerns underlying the cooperation requirement re sulted, in large part, from the success of welfare rights activists in increasing the number of women who receive AFDc.s3 The race of these new welfare recipients was increasingly black. The reappear ance of "morality" concerns about the breakup of the family in the form of the cooperation requirements can similarly be traced to the race of the new recipients.s4 The Moynihan report had been issued in the previous decade, and there was special concern with the structure of black families.ss Thus, the cooperation requirement can be seen as a reaction to the number of poor black women re ceiving AFDC. See 120 CONG. REc. 40,323-24; 41,653 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1356 , at 42-43 (1974 CHANGE 457, 489 (1987-88 
B. Images of the Cooperation Requirement
Underlying the cooperation requirements are assumptions of noncooperation, irresponsibility, and immorality; the requirements take a punitive approach toward both mothers and fathers.56 The stern sanction for failure to comply with the requirement assumes that mothers are not telling the truth, or that they are deliberately withholding information about the father.57 The attempt to coerce paternal involvement assumes that fathers will not otherwise as stime responsibility for their families.
Mothers
When discussing recent changes to the cooperation require ments that would require mothers to provide information before they were eligible to receive AFDC, President Clinton used the term "responsibility":
[W]e must do more to insist on more parental responsibility .... For too long, we have let the men off the hook. We must insist that they do their part to support the children that they help to bring into this world .... Our system should say to mothers, "If you want our help, help us to identify and locate the father so he can be held accountable as well." And it should say to fathers, "We're not going to let you just walk away."5 8
Or, as an editorial on the cooperation requirement phrased it, the issue is "whether taxpayers are obliged to support not just welfare but welfare for anonymous one-night stands."59 In these formula tions, irresponsibility is a label attached to the behavior of both mothers and fathers: mothers have failed to provide information, and fathers have failed to act as responsible fathers.60
The cooperation requirement has come to stand for illegiti macy. 61 Coinciding with the increasing number of African Ameri- can welfare recipients, AFDC is transformed into a condemnation of the mother's morality, rather than a program for meeting the needs of children.62 By admitting that a child was conceived as a result of a one-night stand with a man whose social security number she does not know, the mother's actual cooperation is irrelevant.63 She must meet certain standards of responsibility not just in how much she must report, but also in the behavior that she is reporting. The reporting standards appear to be punishing the underlying behavior.
Indeed, "responsibility" has become a code word in contempo rary welfare debates.64 Society views women who have additional children while on welfare as immoral, irresponsible, and undeserv ing, in contrast to wealthier woman who can "afford" to have chil dren. 6 5 In an essay that compares the reasons that poor IIlV infected mothers and infertile women have children, Carol Sanger notes:
[I]f we accept motherhood as a good choice for women whose lives are rich in resources because it is understood to be a source of self and community esteem, of family life, of continuity, and of loving re lationships, then the decision to have a child when made by women with few external resources, should make similar sense. 66
The cooperation requirement is simply another example of an attempt to impose morality on women.67 The nature of the cooper ation requirement is such that it may require close questioning of the woman's sexual history. 2523, 2523-24 (1995) (describing the "conservative" view, in which it is "morally reckless" to have additional chil dren without sufficient financial resources). 67. The welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996 contained $250 million for "abstinence education," and $400 million in extra money to states that controlled their "illegitimate"
birthrates. See Joyce Purnick, Welfare Bill: Legislating Morality?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at Bl.
questionnaires that ask about sexual activity around the time that the child was conceived.68 There seems to be no understanding of the loss of dignity that accompanies questions regarding the woman's sexual history.69 Especially in light of the historical treat ment of black women's sexuality in this country, the cooperation requirement is particularly punitive. 1 0
Fathers
For fathers, there are comparable assumptions of irresponsibil ity and noncooperation.71 Indeed, one of the purposes of the coop eration requirement was to ensure that fathers remained present in their children's lives; thus revealing an underlying assumption that, without such an incentive, fathers would not participate in child rearing. That is, unless they are coerced into paying money, fathers not only will not support their children, but will also remain uninvolved in their children's lives, abandoning the family itself.72 So coercive is this requirement that fathers who provide support are essentially required to support not only their own children, but also any other children in the family. The so-called sibling rule deems any income received to be part of the entire family's income. Thus, the child of an AFDC mother with a relatively wealthy father is supported in the same manner as her half-siblings, whose father(s) may be poorer.73 
71.
See also Chambers, supra note 26, at 2576 ("The irresponsibility of fathers takes three forms: they bring into the world 'illegitimate' children they do not intend to support, they leave marriages they should remain in, and, whether married or not, they fail to pay support for the children they leave behind.").
72. Images of the "absent father" suggest a dysfunctional family structure, one that allegedly characterizes low-income families.74 Indeed, the Moynihan report of 1965 linked African American pov erty to the absence of black fathers.75 While advocates of paternal presence assume that the absent father is responsible for many so cial problems, and thus believe that keeping fathers involved will cure those problems, this is not necessarily true. First, the history of the black family is not about the absence of fathers.76 Historically, contrary to the Moynihan report, black families have been stable. In detailed research, Herbert Gutman concluded that slavery was not responsible for the disintegration of black families, and instead blamed an absence of work for any such crumbling.77 Black fa thers, then, have been a strong presence within their families.
Nonetheless, while the involvement of fathers is generally a good thing, it is not always critical or beneficial. First, fathers may be absent for "good cause," such as violence between the parents7s or against the children. For example, more than half of all partici pants in welfare-to-work programs appear to be domestic violence victims.79 Numerous studies have shown that children are healthier in a violence-free environment, albeit one without a father, than in mother did not have to include all of her children on the welfare grant; she could receive child support for one child, while receiving AFDC for her other children. See Bowen, 107 S. Second, a father's presence may not be necessary for the well being of the children. It is poverty, not absent fathers, that corre lates most highly with negative outcomes for children, such as delin quency.82 While some studies show that children in single-parent households are more likely to become delinquents than are those in two-parent families, and those in extended families,s3 these data show that it is having at least two parents -neither (or none) of whom may be a father -that correlates with better outcomes. Of course, poverty correlates with the absence of a father -the most common reason for women to begin receiving AFDC is the depar ture of a father84 -but this is due to women's lower earning ability and the economic structure, rather than the per se absence of an other parent in the family. [Vol. 95:965 household.8 6 While child support collection efforts attempt to pro mote paternal financial and emotional support, the plain fact is that many of the men simply do not have the financial resources to sup port their families adequately; child support collection is not a pan acea for poverty.
Third, black children in two-parent families still have much higher poverty rates than do white children who are in single-parent households.81 Simply requiring paternal presence is not a guaran tor of affluence, especially in light of the limited job opportunities for black men. The unemployment rate for African American men is much higher than for white men.88
C. Realities Behind the Cooperation Requirement
The actual facts are very different from the apparent images of noncooperation. Studies of welfare recipients, of fathers, and of narratives in court cases portray a very different image from that assumed by AFDC.
Actual Behavior of Mothers and Fathers
Most AFDC recipients do provide information about the father, and child support agency directors generally believe that mothers are willing to cooperate in establishing the father's identity.89 In deed, women have sued their local child support offices to force them to pursue support orders.9o Women are, then, more than will ing to cooperate. One study of custodial parents who had not yet obtained a child support order found that all of the mothers had provided the father's name, 75% had provided his home address, 54% had provided his social security number, and 50% had pro vided his work address. When it comes to fathers, there are two diff erent stories: while some putatively absent fathers are in fact present, others do not even see themselves as fathers. On the one hand, far from aban doning the family uilit, "absent" fathers often provide regular sup port "under the table."94 In her study of how AFDC recipients were able to support themselves, Kathryn Edin found that more women received money from absent fathers outside of the child support system than did so through the system -twenty-three per cent versus fifteen percent.95 Almost one-quarter of the recipients in her study, then, acknowledged receiving unreporte4 money from 92. See id. Kathryn Edin has reported two conflicting results: in one study, she con cluded that more than half of AFDC recipients engaged in covert noncooperation with re spect to child support, and in another study, she concluded that virtually every mother cooperated. [T]he fathers of welfare reliant children are much more involved in bearing at least some financial responsibility for their children than official statistics show. Thirty-three per cent of the women in our sample reported that they received regular financial support from the fathers of their children, though only 14 percent received any of that support through official channels. Another 30 percent of the mothers we interviewed said that although they didn't get cash assistance, they received in-kind contributions such as dis posable diapers, school clothing and shoes, and/or Christmas and birthday gifts. KATHRYN [Vol. 95:965 the fathers, even outside of a formal child support order.9 6 We have no way of measuring the actual number of fathers who provide such support, given the tendency to underreport such behavior and the limited means for measuring support.
On the other hand, some fathers provide no support at all. Many fathers who may otherwise be involved with their families are unable to provide support because their income is so low. Forcing such fathers to pay further impoverishes them. Wi thin poor black communities, the unemployment rate of men has exp erienced a steady increase, and jobs are difficult to find.97 Other black fathers are literally absent from the family. Fi rst, ethnographers report that poor black men do not see themselves as fathers, and thus are simply not around for their families.98 Second, even devoted fa thers may be absent because they are in prison. The rate of incar ceration of black men is staggeringly high.99 For example, Kathryn Edin found that of the 112 mothers who had complied with child support officials but were not receiving any money from the fathers, twenty of the fathers were not employed, and another twenty of the fathers were incarcerated. 100
Third, as discussed earlier, there may be good reasons, such as domestic violence, that the fathers are absent. As with many ste reotyp es, the image of the "absent" father is partially true. The rea sons for his absence, however, do not support broad generalizations.
There is, as David Chambers points out, "no easy answer" to the questio� of whether parents who earn below the poverty level 96. This number may be even higher, depending on the willingness of study participants to . a cknowledge illegal income. Edin also found that 29% of the women received covert contributions from their boyfriends, which al so shows male responsibility. 16, 1995, at 53, 53. 100. See EDIN, SINGLE MonmRs AND ABSENT FAnmRs, supra note 95, at 11. Thirty-six women received no support because the father could not be found; two mothers did not know the father's identity; seven mothers had good-cause exemptions because of the father's violent history; and 41 mothers had cases caught in the child support system. See id.
should be'required to pay support.101 While the requirement to pay may promote parental responsibility, the amount collected may be so minimal as to scarcely justify the effort.10 2
Na rratives in Legal Challenges to Cooperation Requirements
In cases challenging the cooperation requirement, advocates employ narratives that speak on three diff erent levels: legal, socio economic, and emotional. These narratives challenge the images of irresponsibility and show the actual effects on families of the AFDC cooperation requirements.10 3 The legal narratives are straightfor ward assertions of the constitutional and statutory claims of the AFD C recipients. The socioeconomic and emotional narratives add "color" to the legal assertions by portraying the life situations of the AFDC recipients. Even if the plaintiff 's race is not men tioned in the complaints or in briefs, or is sometimes visible only by ·implication ("from Puerto Rico"), race appears, obviously, in the courtroom whenever the plaintiffs are present; it may also appear through testimony of expert witnesses.
Nonetheless, there is virtually no mention of race in court opin ions. While race may appear in the advocacy efforts, it simply does not appear in the judicial representation of women challenging the cooperation requirements, even though it is clearly -present in the media and undoubtedly has influenced the structure of American welfare programs. To show the technical separation of r�ce from judicial reasoning, I tum to an Illinois child support cooperation case.
In 1986, an Illfuois federal district court certified as a class AFDC recipients whose benefits were terminated as a result of their failure to cooperate with the state in establishing paternity or obtaining child support. [Vol. 95:965 failure to appear for an appointment, so that the state could termi nate an AFD C grant for even a single nonappearance. 10 5 Other policies allowed caseworkers to determine what the AFDC recipi ent's knowledge should be about the absent parent, rather than re lying on the client's actual knowledge. 106
The stories of two of the named plaintiff s show how these poli cies affected recipients and their children. Geraldine Doston missed a court hearing because her child was ill . She called her lawyer on the morning of the hearing to inform the state attorney's office that she would be unable to app ear, and the attorney was able to get a continuance for a date six months later. Ms. Doston appeared at the later hearing. In the interim, however, she was deemed noncooperative, and her AFDC grant was reduced by about one-third. 101
The court recounted the experience of another named plaintiff , Rosa P., whose grant was cut by more than fifty percent because of her alleged noncooperation: At the trial, the plaintiff s called Donna Franklin, a social work pro fessor at the University of Chicago. Professor Fr anklin testified as to the transience of poor black men and the consequent diffi culties of locating them; she also testified that black women were dispro portionately more likely than black men to identify themselves as The plaintiff s, then, used legal, socioeconomic, and racial narra tives to argue their case, and the judge clearly considered these nar ratives because he mentioned them in the findings of fact.111 Nonetheless, in its conclusions of law, the court never mentioned the interrelationship of the cooperation requirements and the struc ture of black communities -although the court did find the coop eration requirements too harsh. Indeed, outside of Professor Fr anklin's testimony, race does not otherwise appear in the court's opinion. The description of the plaintiffs is completely race-less, so the reader does not even know why Professor Franklin's testimony is relevant. Race is similarly absent in other decisions on the coop-. eration requirement.11 2 The choice not to address race serves, of course, to mark and reinforce the notion that welfare reform litiga tion is seemingly colorblind.11 3
Il. GENDER IDEOLOGY
Poor black men and women occupy separate raced and gendered spaces in our culture.114 As African Americans, they are both perceived as part of the underclass in our society; n s however, 109. See Doston, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, at *70. In a survey of poor black women in the 18-44 age group, 69.7% indicated that they were parents. In the same age group, only 392% of the males responded that they were parents .... [T] he differential for other socioeconomic groups is in the range of five to seven percent. Ethnographers attribute some of the disparity to transiency among the population. There is an anger toward welfare mothers for staying at home and taking care of their children, and toward poor fathers for alleg edly deserting their children. While this anger conforms to tradi tional notions of the male role, it contradicts traditional women's roles: women are supposed to stay home and take care of children.
Ironically, the purpose of the mother's pensions laws, and, at least in part for its first thirty years, of AFDC, was to enable women to stay at home with their children and remain homemakers.118 The state provided financial aid as a substitute for having a man in the house, or for women leaving the house to work. It was only as more blacks -and unmarried women generally -received wel fare that the exp ectations began to change.
Black women have always worked outside of the home.119 Es tablishing programs such as workfare simply institutionalizes images of black women as workers, rather than mothers. It also punishes black women for seeking to enj oy some of the preroga- UNITED STATES, 1920 -1945 tives that white women have traditionally enjoyed, such as the lux ury of not working because of the necessity of caring for children.12 0 Within the ideology of the cult of domesticity, men are the breadwinners. Indeed, in defining their roles, this is how men view themselves.121 Again, however, like black women, black men take their places outside of these traditional images. The child support cooperation requirement treats all men in a fashion that is consis tent with an image of noncooperation and abandonment. This dis paraging image of black men has deep historical roots. The dominant negative cultural image of the black man is as the savage and criminal beast,122 and this image is highly successful in influenc ing public policy.123 In the media, black men are portrayed as dan gerous, thereby influencing "legislators to seek immediate control of young Black men."124 Similarly, police profiles tend to single out black men as potential, or actual, criminals.12s 125. See Cunningham, supra note 14, at 1301 n.8 (discussing his client's race as a factor in his arrest); Davis, supra note 12, at 1661 (discussing race discrimination in criminal proce dure); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Conver gence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 762-66 (1992) ; Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Th irteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEw YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58-59 (discussing the experiences of African-American men stopped by police simply because of their race). [Vol. 95:965 Maya Angelou explains that the caricatured black man, presented in minstrel shows, was someone " 'devoid of all sensibili ties and sensitivities. [Minstrel shows] minimized and diminished the possibility of familial love.' " 1 26 Historically, black men who were slaves were unable to enter into binding marriages; they were frequently separated from their children with little thought.127 Un like white children, whose status was determined by their father, the status of black children was determined by their mother.128 It is the evocation of this caricature, that black men do not care about their children, that appears to inform efforts at child support en forcement. The reality behind this rhetoric contradicts the carica tured image.
Ill CHANGING REPRESENTATION
Race is certainly relevant to advocacy efforts writ large -that is, race affects how welfare is reformed. If only divorced or wid owed white women received welfare, we might expect welfare to look quite different.129 The very term "welfare" has now become associated with race, notwithstanding the many forms of welfare other than AFDC sponsored by the government. It is, conse quently, important to use race in advocacy efforts to show how leg islation affects blacks disproportionately, and how it reinforces negative images of blacks while using those same negative images to justify new and punitive requirements. There is a need to ac knowledge the impact of these negative stereotypes so that they can be confronted in the hope of changing policy.
On the individual representation level, however, the relevance of race appears more questionable. In the child support area, the plaintiff 's race does not affect the applicability of the cooperation requirement, even though it may have been highly relevant to the existence of the requirement itself. On the other hand, race may affect the caseworker's perception of her "client," and it certainly affects the income potential of the father. In this area, it is impor tant for advocates to be aware of how race aff ects the representa tion process, and for advocates to use race to challenge the legal requirements placed on their clients. The diffi cult issues concern the relevance of race and deciding how to use it in the advocacy process.
Thus, fathers' advocates could show that their client's inability to pay child support is based, at least in part, on employment dis crimination against blacks; and mothers' advocates could show how the cooperation requirement reinforces negative images of black motherhood. We need to expand the narratives available to both mothers and fathers. When race may be relevant, the advocate has the obligation to think through the implications of making race based claims a basis for arguments on the client's behalf, and has a corresponding obligation to discuss the utility and consequences of making such claims.
In exploring race consciousness, it is useful to think about Ruth Frankenberg's three paradigms of race.130 Fr ankenberg developed her paradigms through interviews with white women to determine how they thought about race in their own lives. She argues that white women must recognize how race shapes their lives. Fr anken berg found that white women were located within a set of discursive paradigms of race.131 She defines the first, "essentialist racism," as an attitude in which racial difference means inequality,132 while the second, "color/blind racism" ignores diff erences based on race;133 the third is "race cognizance," pursuant to which paying attention to racial diff erences becomes, itself, an antiracist strategy. Through race cognizance, whites self-consciously recognize "that race makes a diff erence in people's lives and that racism makes a difference in U.S. society,"134 but do not believe that racial diff erence leads to inferiority.135 The paradigm of race cognizance, or consciousness, provides a useful perspective on how to recognize race and its at tendant diff erences without using these diff erences as a subordinat ing tool; thinking carefully about the relevance of race need not lead to either racism or essentialism. A. Race-Based Claims
Thinking about the relevance of race suggests how advocates can develop alternative sets of arguments to supplement the ex isting legal stories.136 Race cognizance opens up additional case theories and strategies.
Fathers
Requiring poor fathers to pay child support is, at best, a ques tionable enterprise, not only because they may be unable to do so, but also because, even if they are able to do so, the amount of money spent in collecting the support may exceed the amount col lected. In their child support guidelines, most states set a minimum amount that all noncustodial parents must pay, regardless of their employment status. Such minimums are admirable attempts to en sure that fathers take responsibility, yet they do not account for the realities of involuntarily poor fathers.137 As has already been dis cussed, poor fathers often provide support under-the-table when they are able to do .so. Fathers may provide such support in the form of money, they may provide diapers whenever they are able to do so, or they may participate in other informal support processes.138 Given the existence of an underground economy, pur suant to which diapers might be discounted or traded for services, the fathers might not be able to provide the same financial equivalents if they were subject to strictly financially based child support orders.
On the other hand, I do not advocate allowing fathers to evade responsibility for their children. Of course, when the father has been completely uninvolved in the child's life, and has had no rela tionship with the mother after the child's conception, he perhaps 137. Fo r example, almost two-thirds of the fathers who would be affected by Congres sional legislation that would deny means-tested benefits to fathers who are more than two months delinquent in child support were unemployed; 50% of the affected fathers were re ceiving food stamps or were living in public housing. See Elaine Sorensen, Tapping "Dead beat " Dads No Cure-All fo r Po or Kids, PHOENIX GAZETIE, November 21, 1995 at B7, available in LEXIS, News Library, PHNXGZ File.
138. My clients frequently explained to me that their children's fathers would leave "Pampers" -their term for diapers as well as other child-related objects -whenever they could afford to do so. Cf. EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS, supra note 95, at 22 ("In our interviews with mothers of younger children, we found that Pampers (a generic term used to describe all disposable diapers) were a universally accepted symbolic expression of fatherhood for poor absentee fathers.").
should not be accountable, and correspondingly, the mother should not be responsible for providing information about him. In an ovenvhelming number of families, however, this will not be true because the fathers will be involved with their children139 and the mother should be expected to be candid with her caseworker. If the father has been involved with the mother, with the children, or both, then it seems fair to ask him to contribute in some way. Per haps he could care for the children while the mother works, thereby saving child care costs, or perhaps he should contribute financially, but not accumulate arrearages if he is unemployed for good cause.140 Requiring a :financial contribution, however, may not be the most appropriate method in all child support cases.141
An alternative suggestion is that child support be sought from noncustodial parents only while they are working. While this might appear to be a disincentive to holding a job, such a perspective min imizes the reasons that the parent holds a job. Only a tiny minority of men would rather be, and can aff ord to be, unemployed than pay child support. And, under the current system, there are mecha nisms for dealing with fathers who become voluntarily unemployed so that they can evade child support responsibilities.142 Collection efforts need to distinguish between fathers who do all that they can, and fathers who are, literally, seeking to avoid responsibility. This becomes particularly important within black families, which have a 139. One study found that most unwed fathers visit their children until age two. The study also found that only 12% of unwed black fathers versus 37% of white fathers and 30% 140. This is one of the solutions also suggested by Edin. See EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS, supra note 95, at 27-28. Even if 100% of child support were col lected, welfare would be reduced by only 25%. See Bragg, supra note 95, at D18 (quoting Professor Irwin Garfinkel}.
141. Edin reports that she knows of no studies investigating whether fathers who make relatively small, covert contributions do ultimately make larger contributions as they earn more, but that her interviews indicated that such fathers were more likely to contribute at a later point than fathers who made no contributions at all. See EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS , supra note 95, at 23. When the father has been violent, financial contribu tions may be the only appropriate method of state-supported involvement.
142. Most men will probably not quit their jobs because they are forced to pay child support. See Chambers, supra note 26, at 2596.
(Vol. 95:965 much higher rate of single-mother households than white families.143
Mothers
When it comes to issues of child support, a bottom-line assump tion must be that welfare recipients are cooperating. The problems with child support collection efforts go far beyond issues of cooper ation, as evidenced by the lawsuits against collection agencies and the studies on the amount of cooperation. If the women are not cooperating, then there may well be good cause for failing to do so.144 The actual good cause may vary, from domestic violence to :financial concerns. For example, if they are receiving money under the-table, which exceeds the extra fifty dollars available through a child support order, then they clearly will not want to relinquish such funds. And, given the realities of low welfare grants, this sup plemental support may mean the diff erence between making it and not making it.145 Or, they may believe that formal procedures would adversely affect the father-child relationship and thus be un willing to cooperate.146 Until the level of welfare grants, or the pass-through amount, is increased, perhaps "good cause" should be redefined to include :financial necessity, thus encouraging recipients to provide information about absent fathers without jeopardizing the additional income.
Ideally, custodial parents who receive welfare should be able to decide whether to pursue fathers for child support.147 Cooperation 144. Kathryn Edin asserts that welfare recipients fa il to comply with grant requirements only to ensure their day-to-day survival. See EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS, supra note 95, at 14.
145. Indeed, Edin found that not reporting support was a "rational strategy" because some women did receive more than the $50 pass-through; some women knew that the father would be unable to maintain regular child support payments; and some women believed that CHANGE 619, 656 (1987-88 ) ("One alternative
•.. is to make child support enforcement voluntary for welfare mothers ..•. It seems reason able to suppose that welfare mothers are just as able as nonwelfare mothers to decide whether (it is worthwhile to obtain a child support order]."). While giving women this choice does not address issues of fiscal responsibility, the amount of money foregone by the state would presumably be negligible, especially when compared with the administrative costs of collecting the support.
would no longer be mandatory, but voluntary. Wealthier women certainly have the choice of whether to pursue child support -it seems only fair to allow poor women to have the same option.
While wealthier women do not need welfare grants, and thus do not require the same amount of public support as poorer women, they nonetheless receive some forms of public welfare, albeit in differ ently titled forms.148 Allowing recipient women the opportunity to make this choice would give them an appropriate level of control over their relationship with the fathers and with the welfare system. These welfare reforms would affect all poor women, black and white, and thus, as discussed at the beginning of the essay, may not appear "raced." Because, however, images of black recipients of welfare seem to motivate welfare reform, and given the impact of welfare reform on the black community, a race-conscious lawyering strategy may be warranted. A strategy is race conscious if it recog nizes how welfare policy aff ects the black community; the "welfare queen" image is black, not white, and legal narratives of blacks that do not conform serve to challenge that image and force courts to confront the realities that are obscured by rhetoric.
B. The Relevance of Race fo r Representation
Race consciousness is currently left out of professional responsi bility models149 and the lawyer-client representation process.150 When race is obviously relevant to the representation, as with an African-American attorney representing the Ku Klux Klan, the role 148. For example, the home mortgage deduction, chiid care credits, and social security.
See GORDON, supra note 22, at 4-6; Matthews, supra note 22, at 41.
149. See, e.g., Alfi eri, supra note 20, at 1321 (noting that current ethical codes affirm a "colorblind vision of practice susceptible to racialized forms of narrative"); Barnes, supra note 19, at 793 (same). Sheri Johnson argues that the legal profession needs a "race-shield" law to prevent the negative use of racial images. For further discussion of her proposal, see infra note 165.
The one place that race is beginning to appear in professional responsibility rules is in a prohibition against discrimination that has been adopted by approximately seventeen juris The professional responsibility rules developed to regulate a predominantly white profes sion; it is then no surprise that they lack race consciousness. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn 16-18 (1990) (discussing how race is left out of a prominent text on the lawyering process). For suggestions on how to make students more conscious of such issues, see Hing, supra note 16.
[Vol. 95:965 that race should have with respect to any aspect of the case is highly contested.151 Does an African-American attorney have a special obligation not to take such cases, or does she have an obligation to represent the otherwise unrepresented?1s2 While the lack of ex plicit condonation of, or prohibition on, race consciousness permits lawyers and clients to decide on the appropriate role of race in any particular representation, there is little consensus on frameworks153
for lawyers who need to consider race, much less on whether race consciousness is beneficial in any context. Should lawyers think about race, especially when the case is not about explicitly racial ized issues? I offer below some tentative thoughts on the advisabil ity of race-conscious lawyering in certain contexts.
Professional Responsibility Models
Rules of professional responsibility generally privilege the cli ent's interests over any other interests, including those of the law yer, third parties, or communities.154 If the goals of the representation are set by the client's needs, it nonetheless remains the lawyer's responsibility, pursuant to traditional conceptions of the lawyer's role, to develop and implement the case strategy.155
Although the rules allow lawyers to take into account moral con cerns beyond those explicitly raised by the client, there is no re quirement that this process occur. Scholarly justifications and admonitions for lawyers to consider the "common good" range from a belief that this directly benefits the individual, to more direct appeals to a generalized morality,156 to a recognition of the scarce resources available within some communities.157 Calls for client centered lawyering try to place the client more directly in this pro cess so that the lawyer listens to the client in conducting the repre sentation. Ultimately, however, while power is constantly negotiated,158 it remains the responsibility of the lawyer to raise these concerns when the client does not do so. This section briefly explores the potential conflicts between client, community, and law yer in the representation envisioned by the traditional model of legal ethics.
a. Zealous Advocacy, Pa rt I: Community vs. Client In terests.
Much of the controversy over racialized representation has oc curred in discussions of whether to privilege the "common good" over an individual's putative interest in cases that clearly present the opportunity to make arguments based on race.159 Thus, for ex ample, in exploring the ethical obligations of lawyers in cases in volving black-on-white violence, Professor To ny Alfieri suggests that criminal defense attorneys forego use of certain racialized sto ries of deviance in order to prevent the demeaning of client and community, even when such stories might, in the short run, help the client by preventing conviction.16° By telling such stories, he be lieves, lawyers run the risk of furthering the subordination of racial minorities. In response, Professor Robin Barnes argues that it is important for defense attorneys to use whatever stories will most likely acquit their clients; at worst, by using potentially subordinat ing narratives, lawyers run the risk of simply replicating existing hierarchies.161
157. See Paul R. Tr emblay, To ward a Community-Based Ethic fo r Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101 REV. , 1102 REV. -04 (1990 Fe lstiner, and Cahn, 11 CoRNELL L. REV. 1499 , 1501 -02 (1992 .
159. In addition to those scholars discussed in the text, see Hing, supra note 154 (sug gesting that lawyers be required to counsel their clients that certain courses of action might exacerbate racial tension in the community).
In examining how a lawyer's own affiliation affects her representation, David Wilkins notes that questions about the "relationship among professional role, group affiliation, and personal morality arise in many more mundane areas of legal practice. Consider, for exam ple, a black lawyer defending a company accused of race discrimination, or a woman defend ing an accused rapist, or a Korean-American lawyer negotiating a joint venture with a Korean company." Wi lkins, supra note 151, at 1068. Even in these examples, however, there is a potentially clear conflict based on race or sex. Vol. 95:965 Underlying this debate, however, is an implicit acknowledgment that there will be actual conflicts between individual interests and the common good.162 Resolving these conflicts depends on whose story is privileged: the lawyer's (or client's) vision of a common good, the lawyer's (or client's) vision of what is best for the individ ual, or the profession's vision of what is best for society, regardless of the views of the lawyer or client.163 Conflicts between the com mon good and individual good are highlighted in racialized conflicts because the stories that could be told in such contexts do have the potential to perpetuate stereotypes and inflame interethnic ten sions. Recommendations that attorneys refrain from using these stereotypes are based on a perceived harm to the community, whatever the cost or benefit to the individual client; the counter arguments allege that the interests of the individual client must be privileged.
For my purposes, the interesting aspect of these arguments is the focus on race consciousness. There is an underlying require ment that the attorneys think about the raced, and communal, im pact of their advocacy. This use of race cognizance in per se racialized conflicts should lead to questions about the importance of race consciousness in other typ es of cases, when race could be, but is not explicitly, an issue.
Perhaps we should treat many more cases as involving racial tensions and thus develop rules that apply more universally, rather than requiring lawyers to decide whether their cases do involve such tensions, and then applying special rules to them. Under these circumstances, what we can hope for is that privileging one story is a deliberate step, undertaken by lawyer and client in consultation with each other, and perhaps with the relevant communities.164 How this issue is resolved in any particular representation should, perhaps, not be subj ect to definitive rules, other than a requirement that the lawyer consider the impact on a community of her use of racialized images and discuss this assessment with the client.165 162. Fo r an early recognition of this conflict, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving 1lvo Mas ters: In tegration Ideals and Client In terests in School Desegregation Litigation, BS YALE L.J. 470 (1976) . These conflicts are not, of course, inevitable. They do, however, implicate the issue of the lawyer's role as moral judge or zealous, single-minded advocate.
163. See Hing, supra note 154, at 935-36 (discussing potential conflicts between a client· centered approach and his racialized-tension approach).
164. See generally GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).
165. Perhaps racial stereotyping should be banned, except when it is used as a defensive shield. This policy would not, of course, preclude using statistics to show the impact of cer tain practices, as occurs in disparate impact employment discrimination litigation. See 42 b. Zealous Advocacy, Pa rt II: Lawyer vs. Client. The decision of whether to raise moral concerns that go beyond the client's ac tual legal needs depends on the lawyer's actions. For example, will a lawyer choose to discuss the impact of a client's actions on her community, or will the lawyer choose to pursue nonadversarial techniques?166 That is, the very problem of whether to privilege the client or larger social goals must be solved by the lawyer. As Wil liam Simon points out, " [t] he Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering is that effective lawyers cannot avoid making judgments in terms of their own values and influencing their clients · to adopt those judg ments. "167 The lawyer chooses her clients, and then chooses what advice to offer, and how to conduct the representation. 168 On the other hand, the lawyer, at least pursuant to the profes sional responsibility rules, is supposed to separate her interests from those of her client scrupulously. The Model Rules provide that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the ... lawyer's own inter ests .... " 169 The lawyer's perceived responsibilities to entities other than her client may, however, "limit" the representation110 and potentially conflict with the client's goals.171 How can a lawyer accommodate her own views and those of her client? There are three answers to this dilemma: the lawyer can disclose her potential conflicts and obtain the client's consent to continued representation, she can withdraw completely, or she can advocate for changes in the rules.
The problem, under existing rules, is deciding on the "materiality" of the possible conflict; disclosure or withdrawal is otherwise unnec essary and unwarranted. Nonetheless, regardless of whether the rules would label a conflict as material, the lawyer at least should discuss any potentially raced aspects of the representation, includ ing the lawyer's own perspective on the common good versus indi vidual goals. Pursuing race consciousness makes explicit one form of power that the lawyer enj oys. It also expands the options of legal arguments that are available to the client and makes the client bet� ter informed about her lawyer's decisionmaking.
Representation Process
It is a truism that race and other identity characteristics affect the lawyer-client relationship, although it is less clear how they do so. Diff erences between the lawyer and the client may have an im pact on the rapport between lawyer and client,172 or even on the abilities of the lawyer and client to understand each other. 173 The language used by lawyers and clients may differ because of race or class.174 They may also affect the client's attitude toward her case simply because she feels more comfortable with a lawyer of the same race. Race consciousness is thus important for both the law yer and the client, regardless of the substantive nature of the representation.
Litigation
In crafting complaints and other court documents, in developing a case strategy, what role should race play?175 Race certainly plays a role in how people are perceived in the courtroom.176 Legal ac-tors will perceive a white lawyer with a white client diff erently than a black lawyer with a black client.
Beyond that, however, lawyers must struggle with whether, when, and how to mention race. As discussed above, challenges to the cooperation requirement need not mention race, and, indeed, most court decisions do not. When race is not explicitly an issue, as in the child support cooperation cases, the question is whether and how to make it an issue. The plaintiff 's race could easily make its first appearance in the initial complaint. While the defendant will probably know the plaintiff 's race, a judge may not see the plaintiff until the trial, so the judge will not be conscious of any race issues.111
Regardless of how race figures in the complaint, a lawyer must decide how to use race at trial. Race could become an issue, for example, by calli ng witnesses who will testify to customs in poor black communities, or by showing the disparate impact of race on poor black women.178 Given the many diff erent ways that attor neys can define and construct the relevant stories, these racialized choices become critical to the client's case.119
Most others who have considered the importance of race in de veloping the client's case have focused on criminal encounters, such as African-American men stopped by white police, or whites who commit crimes against blacks. Race is already visible in the differ ences between the victim and defendant.18° It is outside of these (Vol. 95:965 contexts that the issue of representing race becomes much more problematic.
Race may be relevant on many different levels, ranging from explanations for an individual's actions to challenges to white-based rules. For example, race could play several roles in constructing a case theory to challenge the child support cooperation requirement. Fi rst, a lawyer might point to racially biased decisionmaking by an individual caseworker who deemed the client noncooperative. While such decisionmaking may be difficult to document, a review of who has been deemed noncooperative may reveal race discrimi nation.181 Second, a lawyer might introduce sociological evidence as to the employability of, and job availability for, poor black men as a method of explaining why the mother cannot, or will not, pro vide the requisite information about the father.182 Third, the lawyer might challenge, more generally, the cooperation requirement itself by showing its assumptions about welfare recipients. And fourth, the lawyer could challenge the entire welfare system as operating on a racist basis.183
While there is no existing obligation in the professional respon sibility rules that the lawyer consider case strategies on any of these levels, we might choose to add a requirement that the lawyer think through the race implications both of her actions in representing the client, and of the client's case itself.184 Such a requirement would neither ban nor encourage racial narratives, although it should foster more of them as attorneys realize the relevance of race to any particular case. While difficult to enforce, such a re quirement would serve as a reminder and, ideally, as an inspiration.
While I agree with her on the damaging effects of negative racial stereotypes, she focuses on criminal cases; she does not explore how racial images may benefit a plaintiff in a civil case.
181. This is what Martin Garbus found with respect to man-in-the-house rules in King v. Smith. See supra note 36.
182. This appears to have been the theory in Doston. See supra text accompanying note 104.
183. Bringing an equal protection claim based on race may lead courts to examine more closely all of the other possible grounds for decision because of the "last resort rule," pursu ant to which courts will decline to decide a case based on a constitutional ground if a noncon stitutional basis is available. See 184. As David Wi ikins notes, disciplinary rules in this area are highly problematic and inevitably vague. See Wilkins, supra note 151, at 1069 n.183. Nonetheless, this accusation could be leveled at any number of existing rules of legal ethics; it is through adopting and living with these rules that they can acquire content.
In a slightly different context, Professor Johnson has developed comprehensive and rela tively detailed rules to prevent the use of racially derogatory stereotypes. See Johnson, supra note 20.
It would carry a corresponding obligation that the lawyer counsel her client as to the existence, as well as the potential benefits and drawbacks, of such stories.18s
As an alternative to such a yague standard, or as a supplement to it, we could change legal education so that race considerations are made more explicit throughout the curriculum.18 6 Lest I be ac cused of requiring political correctness in the classroom, I would not mandate race-conscious legal education. But, in a manner simi lar to what has happened with respect to sex-gender consciousness in legal education,187 individual professors, with institutional sup port, can attempt to incorporate an awareness of the race concerns of any particular case into any course so that race issues appear outside of classes explicitly concerned with race and racism in American law.188
C. Objections to Race Relevance
There are many objections to race consciousness in representa tion. The first addresses whether it is necessary to think through race in cases to which it seems utterly irrelevant. The simple an swer is no -I am not arguing that all attorneys in all cases become race conscious. Yet only by considering the race implications of a particular case will a lawyer be able to assess the relevance of race. Litigation over the disposition of a testator's property, the custody of children, or the infringement of a patent does not appear to im plicate race or racial images. But if, for example, they involve par..; ties of different races, race may be an issue. And because they all involve application of rules developed in a legal system that, until (Vol. 95:965 relatively recently, failed to recognize the formal civil and political equality of whites and blacks, the standards themselves may be raced.189 It is the suggestion of the significance of considering race that is important as a means of ensuring that the issues are raised.
A second, more serious objection is that a. race-conscious ap proach may actually lead to stereotyping and racism. Using race to frame a litigant's claims can evoke, and invoke, damaging myths.19o This contention is much more difficult to address because it impli cates our attitudes and approaches toward race. Our aspirations to colorblindness are an effort to ensure that race will not matter, that we will treat people as individuals, rather than as raced caricatures. Making race count could easily return us to stereotyping. It may also lead to thinking about only nonwhites as raced, rather than acknowledging the omnipresence of race.
Given, however, that the stereotypes are already present, race may be useful as a means for presenting countermyths and narra tives; or, when the stereotypes help the individual plaintiff win her case, then the attorney and client may decide together to exploit those myths.191 For example, one way of subverting the racialized image of welfare recipients is to emphasize when they are white.
189. See Flagg, supra note 14; Charles R. Lawrence III, Th e Id, the Ego, and Equal Pro tection: Reckoning with Un conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) . My colleague Paul Butler distinguishes between a "liberal critique," which attributes race discrimination to individual actors, and a "radical critique," which suggests that the law "is an instrument of white supremacy." Butler, supra note 180, at 692-95 (explaining this distinction within the criminal law).
190. This is a claim made by Professors Brown, Williams, and Baumann. See Brown et al., supra note 23, at 531, 537-38. Professor To ny Alfieri notes that critical race theorists could "complain that race-consciousness encourages an essentialist construction of racial identity and narratives in legal storytelling." Alfieri, supra note 20, at 1340. His response is to advocate "contingent and ... unstable notion[s]" as the basis for storytelling. Id.
191. Thinking about the relevance of race could, as Professor Margaret Russell suggests, result in another problem: "rampant and misguided uses of so-called 'racial' or 'cultural' defenses and arguments." Russell, supra note 113, at 1449. Fo r discussion of this potential problem, see, e.g., Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL L. REv. 1053 (1994) 339, 357-59 (1995) (discussing the dilemmas involved in recognizing culturally specific claims); Abbe Smith, On Representing a Vi ctim of Crime, in LAW STORIES 149, 162-63 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996) (exploring whether a lesbian public defender would raise arguments that the defendant was provoked because of his victim's lesbian sexual relationship). There are, however, existing mechanisms for handling such un substantiated defenses that should prevent them from being raised. When such mechanisms do not exist, then, as a culture, we must decide whether to allow such claims to proceed. Indeed, the more that they are raised, the more opportunities available for establishing their irrelevance and inapplicability. While this does not mean that only "colorblind" claims should be permitted, it does mean that only nonfrivolous race-based claims should be brought.
I hope· that the effort to think through and interrogate race would prevent stereotyping and instead lead to a healthy apprecia tion of the difference that race makes, and the detrimental effects of a failure to understand the impact of allegedly race-neutral deci sionmaking.192 I do not believe that race must be mentioned in every case, nor even that it is relevant to every legal dispute; it may help, for example, to use "neutral" language to describe the parties in an attempt to avoid stereotyping. My argument is that lawyers need to think about race, to become conscious of the issues of race within their advocacy, rather than refer to, or avoid referring to, race constantly in their litigation.193 Many types of advocacy have the potential to implicate race on some level, whether it be an indi vidual's racist actions or laws developed in a legal system that has excluded blacks; the critical dilemma is deciding if and how to han dle these issues. It becomes important to acknowledge that our model of lawyering was not developed in a colorblind world, and that it is not, and should not be, colorblind.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding liberal integrationist goals, we remain a race conscious society. When thinking through a case strategy, when de veloping techniques for the courtroom, advocates need to consider the implications of race. Using race consciousness in client advo cacy requires asking "the race question" in representation and dis cussing raced issues with the client. It means questioning the alleged neutrality of the rules governing representation to see how they assume white lawyers and clients.
Consciousness of race in lawyering will certainly improve the representation process with respect to the lawyer-client relation ship. Although it may be less clear how to use race in litigation,
